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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to present an analysis of the role of ﬁnancial incentives, moral hazard and
conﬂicts of interests leading up to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
Design/methodology/approach – The study’s analysis has identiﬁed common structural ﬂaws
throughout the securitization food chain. These structural ﬂaws include inappropriate incentives, the
absence of punishment, moral hazard and conﬂicts of interest. This research sees the full impact of these
structural ﬂaws when considering their co-occurrence throughout the ﬁnancial system. The authors
address systemic defects in the securitization food chain and examine the inter-relationships among
homeowners, mortgage originators, investment banks and investors. The authors also address the role
of exogenous factors, including the SEC, AIG, the credit rating agencies, Congress, business academia
and the business media.
Findings – The study argues that the lack of criminal prosecutions of key ﬁnancial executives has been a
key factor in creating moral hazard. Eight years after the Great Recession ended in the USA, the ﬁnancial
services industry continues to suffer from a crisis of trust with society.
Practical implications – An overwhelming majority of Americans, 89 per cent, believe that the federal
government does a poor job of regulating the ﬁnancial services industry (Puzzanghera, 2014). A study argues
that the current corporate lobbying framework undermines societal expectations of political equality and
consent (Alzola, 2013). The authors believe the Singapore model may be a useful starting point to restructure
regulatory agencies so that they are more responsive to societal concerns and less responsive to special
interests. Finally, the widespread perception is that the ﬁnancial services sector, in particular, is ethically
challenged (Ferguson, 2012); perhaps there would be some beneﬁt from the implementation of ethical climate
monitoring in ﬁrms that have been subject to deferred prosecution agreements for serious ethical violations
(Arnaud, 2010).
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to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
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It takes something more than intelligence to act intelligently (Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and
Punishment).

It is eight years since the Great Recession ofﬁcially ended in the USA, in June 2009 (NBER,
2014). No other economic event, in recent memory, has provoked such profound selfexamination in the USA of the ethical behavior of some of our most revered ﬁnancial
institutions. From a business and society perspective, the behavior of ﬁrms in the
ﬁnancial service sector has damaged conﬁdence in society about the ethical integrity of the
ﬁnancial system (CBS/NYT, 2013). We are now in an excellent position, thanks to details
emerging from hundreds of civil lawsuits, to reﬂect on the causes of economic collapse and
to assess the lessons learned (Ferguson, 2012). Although the US economy has rebounded, the
recovery has been slow and uneven (Lee, 2014). Median household income of US$74,100 in
2012 lags that of 2006, when it stood at US$93,800 (Bricker, 2012). Unemployment, at 6.3 per
cent in 2014, has improved relative to the Great Recession height of 9.6 per cent, but lags prerecession level of 4.6 per cent in 2007 (Labor UB, 2014). Young people are especially
pessimistic about their future, with only 39 per cent believing they will be better off
ﬁnancially as compared to their parents. Comparable ﬁgures for Brazil and China stand at
84 and 81 per cent, respectively (Fry, 2013). Increasingly, young Americans are being asked
to shoulder the ﬁnancial burden of their college debt, with total student loan balances
growing from US$260bn in 2004 to US$1.11tn, ten years later (Lee, 2013). The societal
impacts of the Great Recession, thus continue eight years later.
The ethics literature has produced a considerable body of research which addresses the
role of particular classes of “players” in the Great Recession. These include commercial
banks (Soltani, 2014), ﬁnancial professionals (Graaﬂand and van de Ven, 2011), graduate
business school education (Huhn, 2013), stockbrokers (Angel and McCabe, 2013), credit
rating agencies (Scalet and Kelly, 2012), chief executive ofﬁcers (Ferrell and Ferrell, 2010)
and the business media (Chakravartty and Schiller, 2010). Very little research however, has
focused on the relationships among key players and the co-occurrence of common structural
ﬂaws among various components of the global ﬁnancial system. The focus on individual
components of the ﬁnancial system privileges micro-level analyses and ignores the complex
relationships among government, markets and society that lead to system-wide failure. We
address the call for more descriptive research to examine the interconnected roles of ﬁrms in
society (Rowley and Berman, 2000).
This paper addresses the need to examine systemic defects in the system by focusing on
the ﬁnancial system as a whole, and the multifaceted relationships among key players in the
system. Our study also addresses the need for consolidation in ethics research by applying
common conceptual frames across industry, government, media and academic sectors
(Wood, 2000). Much of the post-mortem analysis of the crisis in the popular press (Reckard
and Hamilton, 2014) and even in academic journals (Boddy, 2011) offers up moral
assessments of various parties to the crisis. Our focus, eschews such analysis, to concentrate
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on more managerially relevant factors, such as the role of incentives/punishments, moral
hazard and conﬂicts of interest among the key players in the securitization food chain.
We address the inter-relationships among components of the “securitization food chain”,
i.e. homeowners, mortgage originators, investment banks and investors. We also address
the role of exogenous parties, what we refer to as “key enablers”, i.e. the ratings agencies,
AIG, Congress, regulatory agencies, academia and business media (Figure 1). We approach
the ﬁnancial crisis from a holistic perspective, analyzing the interrelationships among
parties with the goal of developing a better understanding of systemic factors leading to the
ﬁnancial crisis. The research study may have several academic and practical contributions
beyond the ﬁnancial services sector to include any context involving problematic incentives
and conﬂicts of interests. The analysis serves as a guide to regulators and to those in
corporate governance in general, on how system wide failures and perverse incentives can
lead to fraudulent behavior within organizations.
We organize the paper as follows: we begin by deﬁning key terms in our analysis, such
as conﬂicts of interests, incentives and moral hazard. Next, we describe the securitization
food chain, including its key components, homeowners, mortgage originators, investment
banks and investors. We also address the role of key exogenous “enablers” including the
credit rating agencies, AIG, Congress, regulatory agencies, business academia and business
media. Lastly, we offer up summary conclusions and recommendations.
Theoretical framework: the role of incentives, moral hazard and conﬂicts of
interest in the ﬁnancial crisis
In line with objectives in the introduction, we focus on managerially relevant variables that
played a key role in the development of the ﬁnancial crisis. These variables include direct
and indirect incentives, conﬂicts of interest and moral hazard. We discuss these concepts in
the context of relationships outlined in Figure 1.
Conﬂicts of interest
Conﬂicts of interest have been identiﬁed as key variable leading to unethical behavior in
some industries, including medicine (Sah, 2013). We adopt McDonald’s deﬁnition of a
conﬂict of interest. That is:
Securies and
exchange
commission

Homeowners

Figure 1.
Securitization food
chain and key
exogenous entities

Congress

Own elaboration

Credit

AIG

rangs agencies

Mortgage
originators

Investment
banks

Academia

Investors

Business media

a situation in which a person has a private or personal interest suﬃcient to appear to inﬂuence the
objective exercise of his or her oﬃcial duties as, say, a public oﬃcial, an employee, or a
professional (McDonald et al., 2002. p. 68).
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Charles Ferguson, in his Academy Award-winning documentary on the ﬁnancial crisis, the
Inside Job, cites several instances where conﬂicts of interest played a key role in the lead-up
to the collapse of the ﬁnancial system (The Inside Job, 2010). We will present evidence of
conﬂicts of interest throughout the securitization food chain, depicted in Figure 1.
Incentives/punishments
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has identiﬁed risk-taking incentives,
provided by incentive compensation arrangements in the ﬁnancial services industry, as a
key contributing factor to the ﬁnancial crisis (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 2011). The widespread acceptance of the Anglo-Saxon shareholder model within the
ﬁnancial services industry, with its emphasis on the principal-agent problem of alligning
incentive compensation with share price performance, was the moral and philosophical
basis for such compensation practices (Quinn and Jones, 1995). The President Obama signed
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law on July 21, 2010.
Among the Act’s many provisions are new rules for incentive compensation. A large body of
research in behavioral economics supports the view that proper alignment of incentives with
a decision-making environment can be a powerful way to induce certain behaviors
(Kamenica, 2012). We address the role of incentives/punishments, not only in the ﬁnancial
services industry, but also for all players in the securitization food chain. We identify
“revolving door” as a type of indirect incentive to “look the other way” when employees, in
relatively low paying regulatory jobs, are biding their time before they transition to more
remunerative postions in the private sector. We see these indirect incentives as a key
component of the broader process of regulatory capture.
Moral hazard
Moral hazard refers to a situation in which an individual or an institution is more likely to
take risks because the costs that could result will not be borne by the party taking the risks
(Dembe and Boden, 2000). Frequently, moral hazard occurs when there is information
assymetry, a situation in which a party in a transaction has more information than another,
and one party is insulated from the negative consequences of the risk (Krugman, 2009). In
the context of the ﬁnancial crisis, a moral hazard exits if a ﬁnancial institution knows it is
protected by a lender of last resort (government) and, as a result, engages in riskier
investments because it believes losses will be borne by someone else (Stiglitz, 2010). One
peculiar aspect of moral hazard during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 was the absence of
criminal presecution of organizations or individuals for criminal behavior. Instead, the
“punishment” was borne by way of ﬁnancial penalties, payed out by organizations, at the
cost of their shareholders (Ferguson, 2012).
The securitization food chain
The securitization food chain is an industrywide supply chain for generating mortgages
from homeowners and selling them to investment banks. Investment banks, in turn,
repackage them into “stuctured” investments for sale to a variety of investors, including
pension funds, hedge funds and other institutional investors. This supply chain integrates
nearly every segment of the ﬁnancial system (Ferguson, 2012, p. 40). The invention of new
ﬁnancial products such as credit default swaps (CDS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO)
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and “synthetic” mortgage securities, all contributed to a complex, opaque system, wherein
few understood the true dimension of the systemic risk for society. At the heart of the
securitization food chain are four players: home owners, mortgage originators, investment
banks and investors. The securitization food chain could not have prospered, however, with
the tacit support of key exogenous players including the insurance giant AIG, the credit
ratings agencies (CRA), Congress, various regulatory agencies including the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Reserve and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC). Two additional “enablers” of the supply chain have have received
relatively little academic attention for their role in feeding the ﬁnancial food chain –
academic economists, business schools and business media, including business magazines
and 24-h cable business channels (Chakravartty and Schiller, 2010). We now address the role
of ﬁnancial incentives, moral hazard and conﬂicts of interest among each of the majors
players depicted in Figure 1.
Homeowners
Those on the ideological right argue that we should not neglect the role of individual
responsibility and risky choices made by homeowner mortgage-holders as a contributory
factor to the ﬁnancial crisis (Milan and Suﬁ, 2014). A competing narrative, on the left, argues
that predatory ﬁnancial institutions preyed on unsophisticated borrowers with complex,
variable rate, subprime mortgages (Ferguson, 2012). Noticeably, very little research has
addressed consumer decision-making for home mortgages. What were the incentives for
homeowners to engage in “risky” behaviour? And why did home mortgage purchasers
engage in (on reﬂection) such poor decision-making? What was the role of marketing in
consumer decion-making?
In the run up to the crisis, advertising campaigns, such as Citigroup’s “Live Richly”
campaign, targeted middle-class America, urging:
[. . .] potential consumers not to work too hard, to not consider money be all that important, to ﬁnd
meaning and fun from activities that emanate from their own creativity, individuality and
relationships with loved ones [. . .] (Marcus, 2005).

Campaigns such as the Citigroup campaign played their role in urging homeowners to
borrow against the increasing equity in their homes. The campaign is illustrative of how
marketing is implicated in the new spirit of excess of consumerism, where disenchantment
with global consumer culture is repackaged in the promise of privitized life choices
(Chakravartty and Schiller, 2010).
Like investment banks, consumers beneﬁted from risky leverage of appreciating assets
in an up market. The Case-Shiller US National Home Price Index doubled between 2000 and
2006, the largest and fastest increase ever recorded (Case-Shiller, 2012). Indeed, median
household net worth soared in just two years from US$84,400 in 2004 to US$93,800 in 2006,
largely driven by increased home equity (Lee, 2014). Then, there was the absence of
punishment. Like the mortgage originators, homeowners who criminally falsiﬁed ﬁnancial
information for loan application documents, faced little risk of prosecution. So widespread
was the problem that, as early as 2004, the FBI issued, and heavily promoted, a warning of
“an epidemic of mortgage fraud” (Ferguson, 2012, p. 58). Eventually, all pretense of doing
due diligence on the borrowers’ credit worthiness was abandoned with the emergence of
“NINJA loans”, in which the borrower had no income, no job (and no) assets (NINJA). It is
questionable whether many homeowners understood the details of some of the subprime
mortgages they purchased. Robert Gnaizda, President of the Greenlining Institute in
Berkeley, met with Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan, once a year, and reported the following
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conversation: “We gave him an example of Countrywide, and 150 different complex
adjustable-rate mortgages. He said, “If you had a doctorate in math, you wouldn’t be able to
understand them enough to know which was good for you and which wasn’t” (Greenspan,
2010).
From 2000 onward, as home values rocketed and wages stagnated, homeowners used
their home equity as collateral to borrow more. This debt-ﬁnanced consumption had real, if
short term, economic beneﬁts, fueling consumption-driven economic growth. Research
indicates that much of the borrowing against home equity appears to have been spent on
consumer goods and ill-fated improvements to homes whose values would soon plummet.
Little of the borrowed money appears to have been used to pay off credit cards or invest in
securities, or busineses (Akst, 2014). Some mortgage holders were home ﬂippers –
speculating on buying multiple houses with no intent to occupy them, hoping, however, to
ﬂip them at a proﬁt. The homo economicus perspective sees these consumers as
materialistic, utility maximisers, hoping to extract maximum individual proﬁt. In this
Darwinian view of the world, homeowners who leveraged the most won. In sum, according
to the homo economicus view, homeowners made an economic bet and lost.
How useful is this perspective? The account of irresponsible, proﬂigate borrowers, feeds
into centuries-old narratives, condemning borrowers on moral and religious grounds.
Whatever its truth value, it has little analytical usefulness if one’s goal is to redesign an
economic system to prevent such a recurrence. One cannot legislate morality. One can,
however, address the role of incentives that fuel such behaviour.
Unlike the Great Depression of 1929, when home debt relief was a major, if belated,
response to the crisis, there appears to be little evidence that mortgage holders expected to
be bailed out en mass by the federal government. Indeed, the tendency in the media to
demonize overextended homeowners probably contributed to the muted response by the
federal government to bail out homeowner debtors in the same way that the ﬁnancial
services industry was bailed out (Milan and Suﬁ, 2014). The behavior of home owners,
therefore, does not seem to ﬁt the deﬁnition of moral hazard; they could not reasonably
believe that any other party would shoulder the expense of bailing them out. The ﬁnancial
incentives to take out mortgages were strong; a decade of Chinese purchases of US securities
and a low interest policy of the “Greenspan” Federal Reserve made mortgages cheap. Tax
incentives on mortgage interest expense, and an absence of punishment for lying about
income on loan applications – a federal offense – all conspired to incentivise the “gold rush”
to acquire ever larger mortgages. These ﬁnancial incentives were clothed in a national
ideology promoting a home ownership culture. The ideology was perhaps best championed
by President George Bush, who famously stated on October 15, 2002, “you don’t have to
have a lousy home, the low income earner can have just as nice a home as anyone else” (The
Inside Job, 2010). On the left, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, contributed to the
creation of a subprime market, and was seen as a way to encourage home ownership among
minorities and low income groups.
To fully inderstand the behavior of homeoweners, one must look to the role another key
player in the securitization food chain; the mortgage originating sector for high pressure,
deceptive and often illegal, sales practices.
Mortgage originators
The mortgage origination business underwent a dramatic restructuring in the 1980s. For
decades, banks made home loans according to the “originate and hold” model. The bank that
originated the mortgage held the mortgage. Thus, banks had a powerful ﬁnancial incentive
to do due dilligence on the borrower’s ability to pay back the loan over the duration of the
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mortgage. The new model “originate and distribute”, quickly dubbed “securitization’, pooled
illiquid assets, like mortgages and transformed them into liquid assets that were tradable on
the open market. These ﬁnancial innovations were called mortgage backed securities (MBS).
The new ﬁnancial incentives for the mortgage originator were very different from the old
“originate and hold” model. The primary economic incentive under the new “originate and
distribute” model is to hold the mortgage for as little time as possible, before unloading it to
the next player in the securitization food chain.
Each sale gives the mortgage originator more money with which to make more loans; it
has little incentive to monitor the underlying risk of the mortgages it originates. In principle,
the originate and distribute model works well so long as investors can accurately assess the
risk inherent in the securities (Roubini and Minh, 2010). A transparent process facilitates
risk assessment; an opaque, complex and fraudulant process frustrates due diligence.
Among the goals for regulation of any market are, ﬁrst, to maintain market conﬁdence,
second, to secure an appropriate degree of protections for consumers and investors and,
third, to reduce the extent to which a regulated entity can be used for a purpose connected
with the crime. Remarkably, the mortgage origination business was largely unregulated.
With the beneﬁt of eight years of hindsight since the economic recovery ofﬁcially began, we
now have a large body of new information to shine a light on the inner workings of the
mortgage origination business, thanks largely to information revealed in civil lawsuits
among the parties for recovery of fraudulently obtained money.
Extensive evidence of unethical and sometimes, outright fraudulent behavior, in the
mortgage origination sector, is revealed in recent civil lawsuits. Perverse incentives
appeared to play a crucial role in many of these cases, including the following (Ferguson,
2012):
 Payments by lenders to mortgage brokers based on “yield spread premiums”. These
incentives effectively functioned as inducements for pushing borrowers into the
most expensive loans possible.
 Negative quality control. There was widespread evidence of covert strategies by
senior executives at mortgage originators to emasculate in-house risk management
and quality control functions. The muting of risk management appears to have been
motivated by incentives that rewarded high-yield loans regardless of risks, and to
cover up risks that were identiﬁed.
 The proliferation of deceptive loan structures and sales practices. More than 30 per
cent of all homeowners receiving subprime loans during the lead-up to the ﬁnancial
crisis actually would have qualiﬁed for a prime loan.
 Widespread fraudulent deception committed against immigrants with poor English
and weak ﬁnancial skills who were misinformed about the contents of their loan
documents. The incentives to prey on immigrants were strong as this group was
unlikely to report malfeasance to the police.The FBI reported that “80 per cent of all
reported fraud cases involve collaboration or collusion by industry insiders” (US
Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2005, p. D1).
 CEOs of mortgage origination companies were aware of and incentivised the
origination of loans they knew were likely to fail. At one company, the CEO made a
presentation to their Board stating that their goal “was to achieve 82 per cent higher
risk originations by 2008”, while internal reviews of one of their high-production
centers revealed that 58 per cent of loans reviewed were found to have high levels of
fraud. The managers of the unit involved were not disciplined, and investors were
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not notiﬁed that the loans they had purchased from these centers contained
fraudulent documentation.
CEOs and senior executives presented false statements to investors, auditors and
the public, both during the bubble and afterward, as their ﬁrms started to collapse.

While the above examples point to a case of systemic unethical practices and widespread
fraudulent behavior in the mortgage origination sector, evidence also suggests that they
were often abetted by auditing ﬁrms who “looked the other way”. The auditing ﬁrms
showed “professional negligence” and investment banks continued to demand higher
yielding loans from higher-risk originations. Investment banks were little concerned with
the long-term performance of the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or evidenced much
ﬁduciary concern for the welfare of their investor customers (Ferguson, 2012).
In the case of mortgage originators, there appears to be strong evidence that problematic
incentives drove behavior that was frequently unethical, and often fraudulent. The lack of
regulatory oversight, and the absence of civil or criminal litigation, all functioned to create a
moral hazard at both an organizational and individual level. As there was no meaningful
professional certiﬁcation among mortgage originators, there was little opportunity for
professional ethical indoctrination as is the case in other professional ﬁelds ﬁelds. At the
organizational level, the risks associated with non-performing loans was not borne by the
loan origination companies themselves under the “originate and distribute” model, but,
instead, got passed along the securitization food chain – a classic case of moral hazard. At
the individual level, those employees who ofﬂoaded risky, but proﬁtable, subprime loans to
“dupes” suffered no meaningful consequences when the home loans failed. Individual
mortgage originators face little prospect of criminal prosecution or internal organization
censure for criminal doctoring of loan documents.
More broadly, the above analysis of he mortgage origination industry points to the
contested nature of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the incompatibility of moral
and governance frameworks within an industry not known for professional ethics training
of its employees (Mitnick, 2000).
Investment banks
Critical reviews of the CSR literature have called for more descriptive research on how ﬁrms’
roles in society are shaped in the interactions between ﬁrms and their stakeholders (Grifﬁn,
2000). We address these roles by examining a number of questions. Why did investment
banks so aggressively incentivise unethical, and sometimes, fraudulent behavior for their
partners, the mortgage origination companies? Why would they seek loans that would have
a high probability of failing? Was this a simple case of information assymetry, whereby only
the mortgage origination companies truly knew the poor quality of their home loans?
Answers to these questions are necessary before we can understand the role of CSR in the
ﬁnancial services sector.
The role of incentives at investment banks was more complex than the case at the
mortgage origination companies. First, there was at least an implicit assumption that
investment banks had a ﬁduciary duty to act in the best interest of their customers and
counter parties. Second, some investment banks were so big, and so integrated into the
global ﬁnancial system, that their failure posed the threat of systemic global ﬁnancial
collapse. In other words, they were “too big to fail”.
Subprime home loans had higher interest yields and, therefore, could be packaged and
sold more easily to institutional investors, so long as they continued to receive AAA, the
highest quality investment grade from the CRA. Investment banks rarely held onto these
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CDOs for longer than one or two months, before ofﬂoading them onto investors;
consequently, their risk was limited to this brief holding period. Investment banks had an
incentive to source subprime loans over prime, and to pass the economic incentives down
the securitization food chain. Evidence from civil lawsuits shows that internal investigations
at investment banks revealed the extent of the problem with the quality of loans sourced,
and that many loans clearly violated their own internal risk standards. When given a choice
to reject these mortgages, or ignore their internal standards, investment banks invariably
chose the latter (Ferguson, 2012, p. 100).
Stockbrokers have a legal and ethical requirement to recommend only “suitable”
investments to their customers, but contrary to popularly held beliefs before the crisis, most
brokers do not have a stricter, legal ﬁduciary duty to their customers (Angel and McCabe,
2013). This was but one of the many examples of information assymetry that existed
between agents of investment banks and customers who bought CDOs. The information
assymetry created a moral hazard for the investment banks’ agents, as they were insulated
from civil lawsuits based on alledged violations of ﬁduciary duty to investors. Brokerage
ﬁrms often have numerous conﬂicts of interest with their customers in that products that
pay the highest commissions may not be the best ones for their customers. Comissions
create powerful incentives for the entire securitization food chain but at the same time
produce conﬂicts of interest – a type of ethical pollution. It is doubtful that most customers
are aware of the extent of these conﬂicts of interests, thus creating a classic assymetry of
information. Given that the CDO market is more complex and less transparent than the
equity market, the information assymetry works against efﬁcient markets.
A second issue of incentives concerns the role of executive compensation. Many believe
that excessive executive compensation and ﬂawed incentive compensation practices can at
least be partly blamed for the imprudent risk-taking that helped spark the economic crisis
(Grant Thornton, 2014). The bonus culture mentality of the investment banks was born out
of an attempt to address the age-old principal-agent problem. To align compensation of
agents (executives) more directly with the interests of principals (shareholders), bonuses
were used to reward executives for actions that maximised proﬁtability. This is standard
practice in corporate America. The incentive problem at investment banks, however, was
the mis-aligned timing of incentives versus performance; cash bonuses were awarded based
on short-term proﬁts, but there were no penalties for long-term losses. Consider the basic
bet: you make an extra US$10m a year by making high-risk, high-reward bets, but you put
your ﬁnancial institution at risk. If the institution fails, shareholders pay the bill. If your
institution is too big to fail, tax payers pay the bill. The bet is frought with moral hazard.
The problem with bonus-heavy incentives was particularly acute at investment banks. This
was because many employees below the level of top executive positions were engaged in
activities sufﬁciently risky to expose their institution to material ﬁnancial loss, e.g. traders
with large position limits relative to the bank’s overall risk tolerance (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 2011). Similarly, groups of emplyees who are subject to similar
incentive-based compensation arrangements may, in the aggregate, expose a ﬁnancial
institution to a material amount of credit risk (note this was wisespead in the loan
origination business).
The systemic risk posed by these incentive structures was described in 2005, by
Raghuram Rajan, then the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund. He delivered
a paper at the annual Jackson Hole Symposium, the most elite banking conference in the
world. Rajan’s paper focused on incentive structures that generated huge cash bonuses
based on short-term proﬁts, but which imposed no penalties for later losses. Rajan argued

that these incentives encouraged bankers to take risks that might eventually destroy their
ﬁrms, or even the entire ﬁnancial system (2006). Raghuram later added:
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It’s very easy to generate performance by taking on more risk. And so what you need to do is
compensate for risk-adjusted performance. And that is where all the bodies are buried (2010).

There have been some proposals to address the incentive problem at investment banks.
Among them include the need to (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2011):
 make risk adjustments to the amount of incentive compensation award for an
employee to take into account the risk the employees’ activities may pose to the
organization;
 defer a portion of the incentive compensation awards;
 identify key employees for whom incentive compensation arrangements may pose a
threat to the organization’s safety; and
 involve risk-management and control personnel when designing incentive
compensation arrangements.
Perhaps a more radical approach to executive compensation is warranted in light of
increasing evidence that the favored tools of regulators and shareholders – deferral and
often complex long-term incentive structures – may not produce the hoped-for results (PWC,
2012). A PWC survey of global senior executives in the ﬁnancial services sectors shows that
only a limited number of executives are motivated by highly leveraged and volatile pay
packages. The same survey found that participants believed that pay is as much about
fairness and recognition as it is about incentives. The exclusive focus on share price
incentive models of executive compensation may potentially blind us to viable alternatives
to organizing the relationship between the investment banking industry and society (Matten
and Moon, 2008).
In sum, when one evaluates behavior in the investment bank sector, problematic
incentives, moral hazard and conﬂicts of interests (exacerbated by information
asymmetries) appear to play a large role in executive decision-making. The actions
undertaken by investment banks in constructing risky CDOs, on a base of shaky subprime
mortgages, however, would not have worked were it not for the cloak of legitimacy provided
by the CRAs. Without the AAA seal of approval from the CRAs, the banks could not have
sold these CDOs to institutional investors. Next, we examine the role of incentives, conﬂicts
of interest and moral hazard at the exogenous entities, beginning with, CRAs.
Exogenous entities
Credit rating agencies
The CRA industry operates as a specialized information market whose product serves as a
public good. CRAs evaluate securities issued by ﬁrms and governments to determine the
likelihood that the issuer will repay the debt. CRAs use their proprietary models to provide a
single rating, such as AAA or Aaa, to represent the creditworthiness of ﬁrms. Many
investors relied on these ratings, and for institutional investors, the expert opinion
functioned as authorized seals of approval (Steven and Kelley, 2012). Additionally, CRAs
advise issuers of CDOs how to package their debt instruments to receive a favorable rating.
Investment banks, in turn, rely on these ratings to attract investment buyers (Rom, 2009).
Few would argue that the CRA performed their function adequately in the lead-up to the
ﬁnancial crisis. In the span of a couple of months, in 2008, previously AAA-rated bonds fell
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into junk status to the tune of US$14tn. Days before AIG was bailed out by the government,
it had received AA ratings from the CRA.
The CRA industry is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
whose responsibility, for the CRAs, is to ensure the quality of ratings and prevent
conﬂicts of interests. By its criteria, the SEC failed in its supervisory role over the
CRAs. The CRAs illustrate the presence of conﬂicts of interest, problematic incentives
and moral hazard.
The issuer-pay compensation model creates a prima facie case of conﬂict of interest.
The problem is confounded when CRAs offer consulting services to bond issuers on
how to design CDOs to get speciﬁc ratings. The conﬂict of interest arises if the CRA
privileges the satisfying of client interest over the provision of accurate ratings. The
consulting conﬂict of interest arises when the CRA receives signiﬁcant fees for
consulting services on how to package securities that they will later rate. The conﬂicts
of interests between lucrative revenues verus accurate rating creates an environment
where “tying” and “notching” are likely to occur. Both of these activities are explicitly
proscribed by the SEC, but there appears to have been little attempt at enforcement
(Coskun, 2008). Before the unravelling of the crisis, many investors believed that the
CRAs had a legal obligation to provide accurate ratings. As the crisis unfurled, many
were dismayed to ﬁnd that the CRAs “analysis” was insulated from lawsuits via ﬁrst
Amendment, free speech protection; the “analysis” represented nothing more
substantial than their “opinions”. The “free speech” protection for the CRA effectively
functioned as a moral hazard, ensuring that the CRAs would bear no legal – and in turn,
no ﬁnancial – consequences for their inﬂated ratings. The impact of the moral hazard
was all the greater for the extent of the information assymetry that existed between
corporate lawyers of CRA and the outside investors. The conﬂicts of interest built in to
the issuer-pay model ensured that the ﬁnancial incentives for the CRAs rewarded
behavior that tailored pleasing ratings to their customers at the expense of accurate
information for the investor. Another aspect of conﬂict of interest is the concept of the
“revolving door”. The movement of individuals from the CRA to investment banks,
often at multiples of salaries, sometimes to institutions whose CDOs they had
previously rated, creates an additional conﬂict of interest and indirect incentive to “look
the other way” when tasked with rating future employers’ securities. Staff at CRA know
that their future career prospects are often at stake when they evaluate securities from
customers. Because CRA produce a public good, the combination of conﬂicts of interest
and distorted incentives served to create a “captured agency”. A captured agency
occurs when a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances
the commercial concerns of a particular group (Lee, 2006). As such, it represents a case
of government failure because it creates an opening for ﬁrms to behave in ways
injurous to society (e.g. producing negative externalities). Strier recommends that the
federal government prohibit the issuer-pay model, ban CRA from rating issues from the
same client for more than ﬁve years, and from consulting on the design of any issue it
rates (Strier, 2008). The SEC, with input from the CRA industry, is currently evaluating
the best response to regulating the the CRAs.
Securities and exchange commission
The SEC, along with the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), is one of a number of regulatory institutions whose statutory role
includes the assurance of the efﬁcient functioning of the ﬁnancial services market and the
protection of investors. The SEC, in particular, has come in for substantial criticism for its
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failure to live up to its statutory mandate in the lead up to, and the subsequent unfolding of
the ﬁnancial crisis. Among the criticisms levelled at the SEC, include conﬂicts of interest,
revolving door policy, insufﬁcient ﬁnancial incentives to hire and maintain highly
qualiﬁed staff; all attributes that point toward regulatory capture. Harry Markopolos, a
ﬁnancial analyst who spent more than a decade giving repeated warnings of fraud to
the SEC regarding Bernie Madoff, has called the agency “nonfunctional captive to the
industry” (Pressman, 2009). Signiﬁcant conﬂicts of interest arise over the SEC’s
revolving door between staffers and the ﬁrms they regulate. The list of ofﬁcials who
have left the SEC for lucrative jobs in the private sector and who have sometimes
returned to positions in the SEC, is long. This latter trend, referred to as “opposite
revolving door”, is particularly troublesome because it heightens the concern that the
conﬂict of interest could bias SEC oversight and undermine public conﬁdence. A second
manifestation of the revolving door has been the political appointments of former
industry executives into positions of signiﬁcant inﬂuence over regulations that relate to
their former ﬁrms (POGO, 2011). Some of these concerns could be addressed by
strengthening post-employment restrictions.
One way to ensure a regulatory agency does not, or is incapable, of fulﬁlling its mandate,
is to starve it of sufﬁcient resources to do its job. The SEC has been described as underpaid
and understaffed (Ferguson, 2012). The provision of sufﬁcient resources to the SEC to enable
it to fulﬁll its statutory mandate is the responsibility of Congress. One model that could
address some of concerns noted above is the so-called Singapore model, whereby senior
regulatory ofﬁcers are paid market wage rates comparable to remuneration in the ﬁnancial
services industry. Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore, has argued that incentives
are needed to ensure that public service is not so great a sacriﬁce that capable people do not
care to serve in it (Loong, 2012). Nouriel Roubini, economics professor at NYU, put it more
directly, “people charged with overseeing the stability of the global ﬁnancial system should
reasonably be paid more than a receptionists at Goldman Sachs” (Roubini and Minh, 2010,
p. 220). Singapore was not subject to excessive ﬁnancial leverage of its institutions, being
more tightly regulated, and thus largely survived the ﬁnancial portion of the crisis
unscathed (it did not escape other collateral effects of the crisis such as the drop in world
demand for its exports).
The harshest criticism admonishes the SEC for its failure to prosecute allegations of
widespread criminal behavior in the ﬁnancial services industry (Ferguson, 2012). The lack
of meaningful individual penalties for criminal wrongdoing has led to a cascading series of
allegations that ﬁnancial services ﬁrms are “too big to fail” or “too big to prosecute” or “too
big to jail” or “too big to bar” (Lynch, 2014). During the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis of
the 1980s, a crisis that “only” cost the taxpayer US$124bn, thousands of S&L executives
were prosecuted and hundreds went to jail. As of mid-2014, no senior executive, directly
involved with the crisis, has been criminally prosecuted. The statute of limitations runs
out for many by the end of 2014. The allegations of criminal wrongdoing in the ﬁnancial
services industry include securities fraud, accounting fraud, honest services violations,
bribery, perjury, making false statements to federal investigators and Sarbanes-Oxley
violations (certifying false accounting statements) (Ferguson, 2012, pp. 190-207). Failure
to prosecute criminal behavior leads to moral hazard. Often ﬁrms have been willing to
pay large sums to lock up deferred prosecution agreements, at shareholder expense, to
avoid “uncertainty” and personal embarrassment (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2014). In
Stiglitz’s view, investment banks view ﬁnes as a cost that is outweighed by the potential
proﬁt generated by the actions being sanctioned (Stiglitz, 2010). Absent individual
prosecutions for criminal behavior, agents face a moral hazard, with the cost borne by
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principals (shareholders) and society. Unless there is specter of jail time and a personal
reputation hit, there is little reason to fear retribution from the law. Prosecutors with
limited resources, no matter how dedicated to duty, ﬁnd it difﬁcult to avoid being seduced
by negotiated settlements and the ﬁction of victory. Unless prosecutors face sanctions for
failure to get individual criminal convictions where criminal fraud has occurred, they too,
face a moral hazard.
AIG
Perhaps no single private institution played a more critical role in the ﬁnancial collapse than
AIG. AIG is a multinational insurance company, which specialized in selling insurance on
events – such as the bankruptcy of an investment bank – that were unlikely to occur in any
given year. In the short run, betting huge amounts of money insuring against catastrophes
yielded large revenues and bonuses at AIG. AIGFP, a London subsidiary of AIG, insured
over $500 billion dollars of CDOs against default with CDS. Because credit default swaps
were unregulated, AIG did not have to put aside any money to cover potential losses, and
chose not to purchase reinsurance to hedge against that risk. For investors who owned
CDOs, credit default swaps worked like an insurance policy. An investor who purchased a
credit default swap paid AIG a quarterly premium. If the CDO went bad, AIG promised to
pay the investor for their losses. Unlike regular insurance, speculators could also buy credit
default swaps from AIG to bet against CDOs they did not own. AIG used collateral on
deposit to buy MBS. When the value of these MBS began to plummet as the crisis in the
mortgage market unraveled, AIG had to pay out insurance claims and had to replace losses
in its collateral accounts (Greenberg and Cunningham, 2013). The resulting liquidity crisis,
and imminent bankruptcy, forced the Fed to step in to provide US$85bn in liquidity so that
AIG could honor its credit default swap trading partners. In the end, the inevitable
happened, and when AIG failed, the consequences for these excessive risks were borne by
someone else – the US taxpayer.
The AIG case represents a clear case of moral hazard and the challenge represented by
what economists call the principal-agent problem (Roubini and Minh, 2010). For largescale institutions such as AIG, the principals (shareholders and board of directors) must
employ agents (managers) to serve their best interests. Agents invariably know more
about what is happening at the company (asymmetric information) than principals who
may pursue their own self-interest to destructive effect. The challenge is how to structure
incentives so that agents do not use the ﬁrm’s resources to place outsize, risky bets, to
maximize their bonus and risk destruction of the ﬁrm. In the case of AIG, it was the
actions of a relatively small number of individuals, based in London, which brought the
ruin of a company, and a global ﬁnancial system to the brink of collapse. The principals
at AIG were not ignorant of the risk posed by the London ofﬁce of AIGFP. In 2007, AIG’s
auditors raised warnings. One of them, Joseph St. Denis, resigned in protest after Joseph
Cassano, head of AIGFP, repeatedly blocked him from investigating AIGFP’s
accounting. As was the case in the mortgage origination sector, AIG and investment
banks frequently looked the other way when risk management or internal auditors
questioned risk exposure.
One might expect that shareholders would be highly motivated to prevent such
destructive behavior since they are ultimately the owners. However, as Roubini and others
have pointed out, shareholders of ﬁnancial ﬁrms often do not have so much skin in the
game, as these ﬁrms rely so heavily on borrowed money to ﬁnance their operations than do
ﬁrms in the non-ﬁnancial sector. Absent engaged shareholders, one is left with unsecured
creditors of banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to impose market discipline. However, the
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belief in the lender of last resort support from the Fed undermined the motivation to act. In
one of the more glaring conﬂicts of interests during the crisis, Treasury Secretary and
former Goldman Sachs CEO, Henry Paulson, played a key role in ensuring that over US
$60bn of taxpayer bailout money went to pay holders of CDSs in full, with US$14bn going to
Goldman Sachs.
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Investors
Investors were global – foreign investors bought more than half of CDOs and mortgagebacked securities (MBS) – among their ranks included pension funds, hedge funds, foreign
banks and other institutional investors. Yet, relatively little is written about the role of those
who bought the CDOs and the MBS that fueled the crisis. Nonetheless, incentive
compensation among employees who worked at hedge funds was also geared toward
leveraging risk. For hedge funds, compensation at the ﬁrm level was the so-called 2 and
20: customers were charged fees of 2 per cent of assets managed, while the fund kept 20
per cent of all gains. However, the fund did not participate in losses, creating an
appetite for risk and moral hazard. A similar type of compensation structure operated
at pension funds and mutual funds, in that incentives were structured to achieve
optimal yield, with little attention paid to long-term performance. In time, pension
funds and mutual funds came to trust the ratings of the CRAs uncritically, instead of
doing their own independent research. Unlike some of the unsophisticated homeowners
who took out ill-suited subprime loans, most of the investors were sophisticated
institutional buyers and sometimes, even hedge fund arms of investment banks. They
had access to market analysts and an unending stream of proprietary research.
Therefore, a plausible argument can be made that caveat emptor should apply. The
same access to proprietary research was not available to the public. What investors did
not know, and could not know – as CDS were unregulated – was that, as early as 2006,
Goldman Sachs (and later, other investment banks) started actively betting against
CDOs it had sold to customers. By purchasing credit default swaps from AIG, Goldman
could bet against CDOs it did not own, and then be paid when the CDOs failed
(Ferguson, 2012, pp. 127-132). Neither academic economists nor the 24-h business media
seemed any better informed about these ominous developments.
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Academia
Some economists, such as Jon Hanson, argue that the phenomenon of regulatory
capture extends beyond just regulatory agencies. Business has an incentive to control
anything that can exert control over them, including the business media and academia.
This phenomenon is called “deep capture” (Hanson and Yosifon, 2003). Academia has
long been viewed as a relatively independent source of critical analysis of the ﬁnancial
system. In Inside Job, Charles Ferguson paints an alternative picture of academics as
cheerleaders and apologists for the ﬁnancial services sector. Among Ferguson’s
assertions is that the ﬁnancial services sector creates conﬂicts of interest in academia.
This is achieved through the funding of think tanks at academic institutions, opinion
pieces at leading newspapers and appearances on 24-h business cable channels; speaker
bureaus used to disguise payments to academic economists for lobbying and policy
advocacy; and lucrative board membership on investment banks (Ferguson, 2012,
pp. 240-274). In particular, Ferguson asserts that two-thirds of leading economists in
the ﬁelds of industrial organization and antitrust analysis have been adversely affected
by academic conﬂicts of interests. Furthermore, he asserts, because the scope of these
conﬂicts of interest entails so many economists, the SEC is often stymied in its attempts
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to hire expert witnesses from academia. Driven partly by the criticism of academic
economists’ muted response to the ﬁnancial crisis, in 2012, the American Economic
Association belatedly adopted a code of ethics requiring the disclosure of conﬂicts of
interest in its seven top academic journals.
Since the 1980s, academic economists have been major advocates of deregulation, and
played inﬂuential roles in shaping the US Government policy. In the lead up to the ﬁnancial
crisis, the academic economists framed the discussion of how free markets should
operate, championed the economic contributions of the ﬁnancial services sector and
offered an intellectual bulwark against new ﬁnancial regulations. Very few of these
economic experts warned about the crisis, and even after the crisis, many opposed
regulatory reform. It is unquestionably true that modern ﬁnancial innovations are
critical to the smooth working of a global economy. Yet, by early 2000, ﬁnancial
services ﬁrms were accounting for over 40 per cent of all corporate proﬁts – far out of
proportion to their contribution to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Former
Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, Lord Turner, asked if modern
ﬁnance had become a rent-extracting industry, that is, earnings derived largely from
leveraging one’s position as a bottleneck, rather than from real economic contributions
(Marr, 2009). In business schools across the country, from the mid-1990s onward, neo
Keynesianism, and its more accommodating stance toward regulation of markets, was
on the defensive. In its place, was the widespread celebration of the victory of
unregulated markets, the championing of new ﬁnancial innovations, such as the
securitization of subprime mortgages and growth of over the counter derivatives. The
naturalization of the market, and the privileging of shareholder interests over
stakeholder interests, became increasingly dominant in elite business schools (Huhn,
2013). McMurtry has described this cultural transformation as the growth of the lifeblind structure of economic rationality (McMurtry, 2012).
Business media
The complicity of the business media in creating the ﬁnancial crisis was perhaps best
captured by the comedian Jon Stewart, whose interview with Jim Cramer from CNBC’s Mad
Money, became an online sensation after its airing in 2009 (Stewart, 2009). In essence, the
interview revealed the enormous gap between what cable news advertises itself to its
viewership – a vigorous watchdog of all things ﬁnancial – versus the reality of its
cheerleading of the performance of investment banks both before and during the early
stages of the crisis. A study has asserted that economic journalism has been no mere
reﬂection, but a constitutive element of the crisis (Chakravartty and Schiller, 2010).
Economic pressures for ratings and advertising revenue distort coverage in favor of
infotainment over in-depth scrutiny of social actors and the political-economic processes
that helped propel the crisis. The current economic model that drives news media
substitutes features and editorial over the expensive process of investigative newsgathering.
The conﬂicts of interest arise when the cheerleading activities of such shows such as Mad
Money drive ratings, advertising revenue and “softball” interviews. Indeed, the show’s daily
stock recommendations seemed like a metaphor for a recurring theme of short-term
performance incentives, with little accountability for long-term performance. The
sensationalism of the daily stock recommendations grabs ratings and advertising revenue
while the value of the securities recommended tended to fall after just two days
(Karniouchina et al., 2009). Like the investment banks, the business news media feel the
same pressure to “dance until the music stops”. Miller has argued that the hyper-speculative
news frame serves to depoliticize an underlying ideology of radical market fundamentalism
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(2009). Lost in the clutter of the 24-h business news cycle was any meaningful discussion of
urgent policy choices. The vacuum, instead, was ﬁlled with endless coverage aimed at the
consumer of ﬁnancial services, privileging minute-to-minute coverage of the gyrations of the
stock market. If business media and academia do an inadequate job of policing the ﬁnancial
services sector, then the ultimate power and responsibility to do this rests with the US
Congress.
Congress
The relationship between the ﬁnancial services sector and Congress is analogous to its
relationship to academia and the business media, i.e. it seeks to control that which would
restrict the scope of its freedom to act. Vested interests in the ﬁnancial services industry
have a stake in regulatory activity as the scope of its operations is subject to a wide array of
regulatory institutions. As we have seen in our discussion of academia, when regulators
form expert commissions to examine policy, they seek input from academic and industry
experts. The academic literature focuses on how smaller government units are easier for
concentrated industries to capture. One study presents the opposite scenario, where large,
powerful industries, such as ﬁnancial services, can capture national government and use
that power to block policies at the state level that voters may want (Moore and Giovinazzo,
2012). The most dramatic example of regulatory capture of a national government by the
ﬁnancial services sector was Iceland. At the time of its ﬁnancial collapse, in late 2008, it had
a population of 320,000, a GDP of US$13bn and bank losses of US$100bn (Ferguson, 2012,
p. 253). In the decade leading up to the US ﬁnancial crisis, the ﬁnancial services industry
spent US$5bn in lobbying and campaign contributions, while employing more than 3,000
lobbyists – ﬁve for each member of Congress. The conﬂicts of interests in this scenario seem
self-evident. Are politicians responsive to the electorate, or to a powerful ﬁnancial oligarchy?
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former head of the International Monetary Fund, has speculated
whether the strength of the global ﬁnancial services industry is a threat to political
democracy (2010). Industry has every legal right to lobby Congress for ﬁrst amendment
rights, so the issue is not one of rights, but rather of the economic effects of such rights on
society.
The ﬁnancial services sector has had legislative success in the decades leading up to the
crisis, including its signature victory, the repeal of Glass-Steagall, the Depression era
legislation that created a ﬁrewall between commercial banks (which took deposits and made
loans) and investment banks (which underwrote, bought and sold securities). Congress
repealed the last vestiges of Glass-Steagall with the Financial Services Modernization Act in
1999. The latter Act effectively declared most derivatives off limits to regulation, and setting
the stage for the explosive growth of CDS that ultimately undermined AIG. The FSM Act
was debated in neither the Senate nor the House. The symbiotic relationship between the
government and the ﬁnancial services sector thus produced a dramatic change in the
governance system as it related to the ﬁnance industry. Investment banks reacted to this
deregulation by massively increasing its leverage to as much as 33/1 (meaning that a 3
per cent decline in assets would effectively make it insolvent). The ideological champion of a
radical deregulated approach to free markets was Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan.
Greenspan had little interest in the widely held central banking philosophy that powerful
institutions should attempt to inoculate the economy against the growth of ﬁnancial
bubbles. This was evident in his response to the 1987 stock market crash, when he was
willing to use all the powers of the Fed to rescue it. This philosophy created a Greenspan
“put” – i.e. the market guessed correctly that the Fed would ride to the rescue after a bubble
collapsed. It created a moral hazard on a grand scale.
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Neither did the ﬁnancial service industry have to worry too much about substantial
penalties for what many believe to have been widespread criminal behavior in the industry
(Ferguson, 2012). The Obama administration has excused its failure to prosecute for bubblerelated crimes, by arguing that while much of the behavior in the ﬁnancial services sector
was unethical, it was not illegal “part of my frustration, was that a lot of practices that
should not have been allowed weren’t necessarily against the law” (Obama, 2011). The lack
of criminal prosecutions, in stark contrast to what happened in the aftermath of the S&L
crisis in the 1980s, served to strengthen the effects of moral hazard. As of July 2014, two
investment banks have pleaded guilty to criminal charges, Credit Suisse and BNP Paribas,
the ﬁrst to collusion to defraud the US Government of taxes, and the latter to money
laundering for nations deemed security threats to the USA. Neither bank pleaded guilty to
any charges directly related to its role in the ﬁnancial crisis. The BNP plea is an example of
the principal–agent problem in that burden of the US$9bn in ﬁnes for the criminal actions of
individuals – the agents of the ﬁrm – will be borne by the principals (shareholders). This
lead FBI Director, James Comey to say, “Until shareholders hold corporate chiefs
accountable for following the law, the money will keep walking out the door” (Reckard and
Puzzanghera, 2014).
However, the agents who steer large ﬁnancial ﬁrms appear willing to settle for nonprosecution agreements with large penalties, at shareholder expense, to avoid the
embarrassment and the personal peril of extended trials. Prosecutors, with increasingly
limited resources, due to Congressional “ﬁscal rectitude”, are often seduced by easily
negotiated, non-prosecution settlements. Conversely, what is to protect companies from
Department of Justice (DOJ) or SEC from shakedowns? (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2014).
Congress can make it more difﬁcult for prosecutors to take the easy way out by ordering
them not to take action against companies unless individuals are being charged as well.
Unless individuals are held accountable, for individual criminal behavior, moral hazard will
continue to be a powerful force in the ﬁnancial services industry.
Conclusion
Our analysis has identiﬁed common structural ﬂaws throughout the securitization food
chain. These structural ﬂaws include inappropriate incentives, the absence of punishment,
moral hazard and conﬂicts of interest. We see the full impact of these structural ﬂaws when
we look at their co-occurrence throughout the ﬁnancial system. The structural ﬂaws extend
to government, regulatory agencies, business academics and the business media. Our study
moves beyond moral analysis and normative ethical concerns, with the assumption that
very few parties to the crisis are without moral culpability, and instead, we focus on
systemic issues that are addressable via policy changes. We hope the study will serve as a
guide to regulators, and to those in corporate governance in general, on how system-wide
failures and perverse incentives can lead to fraudulent behavior in organizations and
detrimental effects on society.
We believe that for free markets to work as intended, it is critical to maintain market
conﬁdence, that is, a widespread belief that the same rules of the game apply to all players,
and that none are above the law. The lack of any criminal prosecutions related to this crisis
has damaged such conﬁdence. In a CBS News/New York Times poll in 2012, only 9 per cent
of those polled expressed “A lot of conﬁdence in banks and ﬁnancial institutions”, while 49
per cent believed that “Corruption in banks and ﬁnancial institutions is widespread” (CBS/
NYT, 2012). The ﬁnancial crisis has shaken society’s conﬁdence in the integrity of the
ﬁnancial system. In a national survey by Better Markets, nearly two-thirds of Americans
think the stock market is rigged against them and a majority believes that Wall Street and
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ﬁnancial institutions hurt average Americans (Puzzanghera, 2014). One might expect that
with such concerns about the ﬁnancial sector, the public would be strongly in favor of new
regulations to impose market discipline, but the public seems deeply divided on this issue.
When asked if they thought federal government regulates business too much/too little/right
amount these days, 49 per cent agreed with “too much” versus 22 per cent with “too little”
and 19 per cent with “right amount” (CBS/NYT, 2012). It would seem that the public has
little conﬁdence in government, as they perceive members of Congress to be captive to
special interest groups. A 2013 CBS/NYT poll asked people “Do you think most members of
Congress are more interested in serving the people they represent, or more interested in
serving special interest groups?” Eighty-ﬁve per cent responded “special interests” versus
nine per cent “people” (CBS/NYT, 2013). The public’s cynicism with the ﬁnancial services
sector is surpassed only with its cynicism of Congress, and points to a collective pessimism
that any meaningful reform is possible.
In times of crisis, we might look to media journalism and academia to clarify essential
truths. What are the true causes of the crisis? What are its social costs? What new political
and economic reforms do we need to have in place to ensure no future re-run of this crisis?
How do we ensure that principles of democratic accountability apply to those culpable of
subverting existing laws? We have identiﬁed business media and business academia as key
enablers of the crisis, yet each is subject to similar structural ﬂaws and compromises as
other players in the securitization food chain. Therefore, before either can assume positions
of intellectual leadership, they too will require reputational makeovers.
We identiﬁed risk-taking incentives, provided by incentive compensation arrangements
in the ﬁnancial services industry, as a key contributing factor to the ﬁnancial crisis. It is now
generally understood that compensation practices, which feature a short-term bonus culture
with no clawbacks for long-term performance are problematic. What was less understood is
how employees, several layers below top level executives, were engaged in speculative
activities sufﬁciently risky to expose their institutions to peril. Given the questions that have
been raised by PwC consulting group and others regarding the efﬁcacy of complex,
contingency-based bonus structures, perhaps it is time for behavioral economics to
readdress the principal-agent problem as it relates to bonus structures. At mortgage
origination companies, we see how groups of employees, in relatively modest positions, but
subject to similar incentive-based compensation arrangements, can, in the aggregate, expose
their institutions to failure. Such incentives, in the absence of any professional qualiﬁcations
and ethics training, can lead to being ethically questionable, and often, fraudulent behavior.
Incentive compensation played a lesser role in the decision-making behavior of investors.
Nonetheless, pension funds and other institutional investors, incentivised with short-term
volume goals, may have had their due diligence clouded to the long-term economic
performance of the securities they purchased on behalf of their clients.
It is perhaps surprising, that in a digital age of proliferation of information, that
information assymetries played such a role in the many conﬂicts of interest among the
parties implicated in the securitization food chain. For ﬁnancially unsophisticated
homeowners, the lack of any meaningful disclosure requirements on loan origination
documents left them easy prey for unscrupulous mortgage originators. New disclosure
requirements of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act aim to address
this issue. It is now generally understood that investment banks have neither a morally
accepted, nor legally imposed, ﬁduciary duty to their customers. Presumably, caveat
emptor, will be the dominant creed among investors for the forseeable future. However, one
pernitious aspect of conﬂicts of interest remain – the revolving door between regulators,
government and industry. Unless Congress allocates sufﬁcient resources to regulatory
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authorities such as the SEC, to hire and retain the highest quality personnel and then to hold
them accountable via strict post-employment restrictions, society will continue to lack
conﬁdence in the ability of these institutions to fulﬁll their statutory mandate. Given the
public’s current deep suspicion of Congress, it seems unlikely that such reforms are
politically feasible.
As lender of last resort, the government is in a unique position to create moral hazard for
all the players in the securitization foodchain. The US$700bn bailout of ﬁnancial insitutions
was controversial on both sides of the ideological aisle: on the right, because it meant a de
facto admission of market failure, and on the left, because the bailout priviledged the needs
of Wall Street over Main Street. The more subtle, but no less pernitious form of moral
hazard, was the abject failure to hold responsible parties liable for criminal behavior. That
thousands were prosecuted, and hundreds were jailed, for criminal behavior related to the
1980s savings and loan crisis, makes it implausible that similar behavior did not occur
during the crisis that lead up to the Great Recession. The criminal misdeeds of the ﬁnancial
sector have been extensively documented (Ferguson, 2012). The morphing of “too big to fail”
into “too big to prosecute” may well be the most important legacy of the Great Recession.
Absent individual prosecutions for criminal behavior, agents face a moral hazard, with the
cost borne by principals (shareholders) and society.
We see a number of productive opportunities for reseach on the relationship between
the ﬁnancial services sector and society. First, we see the need for additional empirical
and descriptive research into why stakeholder theory (Mitchell et al., 1997) and CSR
concepts seem to have gained so little traction in guiding the actions of executives in the
investment banking and mortgage origination business. Even when the ﬁnancial services
sector does commit to a broader agenda of CSR, evidence indicates that such commitment
is ambiguous and piecemeal (Furrer et al., 2012). Is ethical training in our graduate and
undergraduate business schools providing the necessary support for stakeholder theory?
Empirical research provides support for the notion that well designed business school
ethics courses cause students to be less supportive of “stockholder-only” view of business
(Simmons et al., 2009). Or is ethics education “captured” by those who teach the primacy
of stockholder perspectives in ﬁnance? Second, research needs to address how CSR in the
ﬁnancial services sector is shaped in the interactions between incentive structures and
the behavior of senior executives within the ﬁrm toward external stakeholders, such as
customers and society (Frooman and Murrel, 2005; Mazutis, 2013). Third, research in the
ﬁnancial services sector needs to address the apparent incongruity between the the
formal descriptions of governance structures within ﬁnancial services companies, as
reported in internal written documents, such as corporate proﬁle and statements of
corporate values and identity, and actual policies and behaviors, as reported in the details
of documents emerging from subsequent civil lawsuits (De Graaf and Stoelhorst, 2009).
Fourth, we need a better understanding of how formal mechanisms of governance
sructures in the ﬁnancial services sector, such as risk management, are undermined by
informal structures, such as emergent organizational culture. Fifth, our study of the
ﬁnancial services industry points to the need for additional research into the relationship
between business and society and the threat of regulatory capture and revolving door
indirect incentives. In particular, additional research is necessary to integrate the the role
of ﬁnancial services lobbying within the broader context of ﬁnancial services CSR
(Anastasiadis, 2013). An overwhelming majority of Americans, 89 per cent, believe that
the federal government does a poor job of regulating the ﬁnancial services industry
(Puzzanghera, 2014). Another study argues that the current corprate lobbying framework
undermines societal expectations of political equality and consent (Alzola, 2013). We

believe the Singapore model may be a useful starting point in restructuring regulatory
agencies so that they are more responsive to societal concerns and less responsive to
special interests. Finally, there is widespread perception that the ﬁnancial services sector,
in particular, is ethically challenged (Ferguson, 2012). Perhaps there would be some
beneﬁt from implementation of ethical climate monitoring in ﬁrms that have been subject
to deferred prosecution agreements for serious ethical violations (Arnaud, 2010).
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